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CORPORATE SUCCESSOR LIABILITY
UNDER CERCLA: WHO's NEXT?
by
Daniel H. Squire, * William P. Ingram, ** and Don J Frost, Jr. *
W TH the enactment of the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA),
Congress sought to achieve a number of goals. Two of the most
prominent goals were the identification and cleanup of inactive hazardous
waste disposal sites and the imposition of liability for the costs of remedying
hazardous conditions on the parties responsible for creating or contributing
to such conditions. Section 107(a)2 of CERCLA specifically identifies four
categories of persons responsible for the costs associated with remedying a
hazardous waste site: (1) current owners and operators of the site; (2) per-
sons owning or operating the site at the time of waste disposal; (3) generators
of hazardous wastes that were disposed of at the site; and (4) transporters
who selected the area as a disposal site.3 CERCLA, however, does not ex-
pressly impose liability on the corporate successors of these responsible par-
ties for costs associated with their predecessors' hazardous waste operations.
Consequently, an important issue concerning CERCLA's reach is to what
extent courts will hold corporate successors jointly and severally liable for
the remediation costs at a waste site where the successors' only connection is
through their predecessors.
This Article addresses that issue. Section I discusses the general rules
governing successor liability, and summarizes the traditional common law
rules governing mergers, consolidations, and stock and asset transactions.
Section I concludes with a discussion of modern expansions of the tradi-
tional exceptions to the general rule of successor liability for asset transfers
and the approaches taken by federal courts in non-CERCLA cases.
Section II analyzes the corporate successor liability issue as it is presently
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1. Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675(1988)).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988).
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developing under CERCLA. It first discusses the approach federal courts
have applied in CERCLA cases. The section then examines the United
States Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) and United States Depart-
ment of Justice's (DOJ) positions with respect to the appropriate successor
liability rules under CERCLA as these agencies have set them forth in policy
guidance documents and briefs.
Section III, drawing upon the preceding discussion of the developing law
of corporate successor liability under CERCLA, analyzes a detailed hypo-
thetical situation. This analysis demonstrates how corporate transactions
can be structured to minimize the acquiring corporation's exposure to poten-
tial successor liability.
I. THE DOCTRINE OF SUCCESSOR LIABILITY
4
A. State Common Law of Corporate Successor Liability
L The Traditional Rules of Corporate Successor Liability
The corporate successor liability issue can arise in two basic contexts: a
statutory merger or consolidation and a sale of the assets of a corporation.
Where the transaction is a statutory merger or consolidation, the surviving
corporation generally acquires all assets and liabilities of the corporations
merged or consolidated, unless the parties have made specific arrangements
to avoid this result.5
Where one corporation purchases the assets of another corporation, the
general rule is that the purchaser does not also acquire the debts and liabili-
ties associated with these assets.6 Courts have fashioned four traditional ex-
ceptions to this general rule, which are triggered when: (1) the purchaser
expressly or implicitly assumes the seller's liabilities;7 (2) the parties enter
into the transaction fraudulently to escape liability;3 (3) the acquisition con-
stitutes a de facto (i.e., non-statutory) merger br consolidation between the
4. Section I does not present an exhaustive discussion of the successor liability doctrine.
Rather, the purpose of this section is to provide a brief summary of the successor liability rules,
their application, and the theories underlying these rules, as the basis for an analysis of the
application of successor liability under CERCLA. For a more thorough discussion, see 15 W.
FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 7117-7129 (rev. perm.
ed. 1983 & Supp. 1989).
5. See generally 15 W. FLETCHER, supra note 4, § 7117, at 178 (consolidation), § 7121,
at 185 (statutory merger). Similarly, when one corporation purchases the stock of a second
corporation, the assets and liabilities of the acquired corporation remain, absent other arrange-
ments, because the acquired corporation's integrity as an on-going corporation has not been
affected at all. Thus, this situation is not one of successor liability since there is no successor.
Whether the acquiring corporation could ever become liable for the obligations of the acquired
corporation involves the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil, which this Article does not
consider. But cf infra notes 97 & 165.
6. See 15 W. FLETCHER, supra note 4, § 7122, at 188.
7. An express assumption is a straightforward concept requiring little discussion. An
implicit assumption is usually found because the purchase agreement is inartfully drafted or
the parties failed to consider the issue at all. See generally 15 W. FLETCHER, supra note 4,
§ 7122, at 189 (discussing mere purchase or acquisition of another company's property).
8. The fraud exception involves tortious or criminal activity and thus is not an appropri-
ate subject for extensive analysis in this Article, which focuses on the proper legal structure of
transactions. In many cases, however, where courts apply another exception, the facts suggest
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purchaser and seller; or (4) the purchaser is merely a continuation of the
seller.9
The policy rationales underlying the traditional rule and its exceptions
include: the protection of minority shareholders and creditors, the proper
assessment of taxes, and the promotion of alienability of corporate assets.10
The de facto-merger and mere continuation exceptions also serve the same
objectives that underlie the general rule of successor liability for statutory
mergers or consolidations.11 In determining whether these two exceptions
apply, the courts focus on the form of the transaction, imposing liability
where the successor is merely the predecessor under a new guise.12 Conse-
quently, under either of these two exceptions, "the central issue is whether
the purchasing corporation effectively has become the selling corporation by
acquiring not only the latter's assets but also its entire business." 13
In determining whether a transaction constitutes a de facto-merger or
consolidation exposing the successor to liability, the courts generally con-
sider the following factors: (1) whether there is a continuation of the enter-
prise of the seller corporation, i.e., through a continuity of management,
other personnel, physical location, assets, and general business operations;
(2) whether there is a continuity of shareholders because the purchasing cor-
poration pays for the acquired assets with shares of its own stock; (3)
whether the seller corporation ceases its ordinary business operations, liqui-
dates, and dissolves as soon as legally and practically possible; and (4)
whether the purchasing corporation assumes those liabilities and obligations
of the seller ordinarily necessary for the uninterrupted continuation of nor-
mal business operations of the seller corporation. 14 Several courts have
noted that not all of these factors are necessary, nor is any one of the factors
alone sufficient, to establish a de facto merger.15
With respect to the traditional continuation exception, the courts look to
factors similar to those pertinent to the de facto merger exception. 16 Gener-
at least a hint of fraud. See generally 15 W. FLETCHER, supra note 4, § 7122, at 189 (footnotes
cases from seventeen jurisdictions where courts found fraud).
9. See id, § 7122, at 189.
10. See Polius v. Clark Equip. Co., 802 F.2d 75, 78 (3d Cir. 1986) (outlines policy ratio-
nales for "corporate contractual world"); Phillips, Product Line Continuity and Successor Cor-
poration Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 906, 909 (1983) (explains rationale behind de facto
merger doctrine).
11. Phillips, supra note 10, at 909.
12. See generally Santa Maria v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 808 F.2d 848, 858-59 n.12 (Ist Cir.
1986) (discussing continuity of enterprise theory); Polius, 802 F.2d at 78 (when form of trans-
fer fails to accurately portray substance, courts may hold new entity is older one in another
guise).
13. Phillips, supra note 10, at 909.
14. Bud Antle, Inc. v. Eastern Foods, Inc., 758 F.2d 1451, 1457-58 (11th Cir. 1985);
accord Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 762 F.2d 303, 311 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 980 (1985); Keller v. Clark Equip. Co., 715 F.2d 1280, 1291 (8th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 1044 (1984); Atlas Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 614 F.2d 860, 870-71 (3d Cir.
1980), cerL denied, 449 U.S. 836 (1980); 15 W. FLETCHER, supra note 4, § 7165.5, at 340
(1983).
15. See. e.g., Bud Antle, Inc., 758 F.2d at 1457-58; Atlas Tool Co., 614 F.2d at 870; In re
Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor, 712 F. Supp. 1010, 1015 (D. Mass. 1989).
16. See 15 W. FLETCHER, supra note 4, § 7122, at 189.
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ally, "[t]he traditional indications of 'continuation' are: common officers,
directors, and stockholders; and only one corporation in existence after the
completion of the sale of assets." 17 A number of courts, however, have elim-
inated the dissolution requirement and instead consider the identity of key
personnel between the selling and purchasing corporations to be the key ele-
ment of a continuation.Is Some courts also have required that the considera-
tion paid in the transaction be inadequate. 19 Regardless of the particular
elements emphasized, however, the court in Bud Antle, Inc. v. Eastern Foods,
Inc. 20 explained that the exception applies when the purchasing corporation
is simply a disguise for essentially the same or similar corporate entity.2 '
2. Modern Exceptions to the General Rule
Courts in several jurisdictions have adopted two closely related excep-
tions-the product-line rule22 and the continuation of the enterprise doc-
trine23-to broaden the scope of liability beyond the four traditional
exceptions. Courts have applied these modem exceptions primarily in prod-
uct liability cases to find a successor strictly liable for injuries caused by
equipment that its predecessor manufactured. 24 However, at least one lower
state court has applied the product-line theory to environmental claims.25
17. Id. at 33 (Supp. 1989); accord Mozingo v. Correct Mfg. Corp., 752 F.2d 168, 174-75
(5th Cir. 1985); Weaver v. Nash Int'l, Inc., 730 F.2d 547, 548 (8th Cir. 1984); Travis v. Harris
Corp., 565 F.2d 443, 447 (7th Cir. 1977); Estey & Assocs., Inc. v. McCulloch Corp., 663 F.
Supp. 167, 171 (D. Or. 1986) (court recognizes traditional continuation exception without
accepting or rejecting it); Groover v. West Coast Shipping Co., 479 F. Supp. 950, 951(S.D.N.Y. 1979); Ladjevardian v. Laidlaw-Coggeshall, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 834, 839 (S.D.N.Y.
1977).
18. Bud Antle, Inc., 758 F.2d at 1458-59; accord Dayton v. Peck, Stow & Wilcox Co., 739
F.2d 690, 693 (1st Cir. 1984); Tucker v. Paxson Mach. Co., 645 F.2d 620, 626 (8th Cir. 1981);
Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437, 440 (7th Cir. 1977).
19. See, eg., Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. ASARCO, Inc., 1989 Hazardous Waste Litig.
Rep. (Andrews Publications) 17,239, 17,305 (W.D. Wash. 1989) (inadequate consideration
deemed fraudulent transfer of assets); Crawford Harbor Assocs. v. Blake Constr. Co., 661 F.
Supp. 880, 884 (E.D. Va. 1987) (inadequate consideration may establish consolidation, contin-
uance, or fraudulent transaction).
20. 758 F.2d 1451 (1lth Cir. 1985).
21. Id. at 1458. The court said:
The mere continuation exception applies when the purchasing corporation is
merely a continuation or reincarnation of the selling corporation.... In deter-
mining whether one corporation is a continuation of another, the test is whether
there is a continuation of the corporate entity of the seller-not whether there is
a continuation of the seller's business operation.
Id. (citations omitted).
22. Jurisdictions that have adopted the product-line rule include the following: California(Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977)); New Jersey (Rami-
rez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 171 N.J. Super. 261, 408 A.2d 818 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979),
aff'd, 86 N.J. 332, 431 A.2d 811 (1981)); Pennsylvania (Dawejko v. Jorgensen Steel Co., 290
Pa. Super. 15, 434 A.2d 106 (1980)).
23. Michigan has adopted the continuation of the enterprise doctrine in Turner v. Bitumi-
nous Casualty Co., 397 Mich. 406, 244 N.W.2d 873 (1976); see infra note 26 and accompany-
ing text.
24. For example, the court in Dawejko, 434 A.2d at 107, 112, held the successor corpora-
tion liable for plaintiff's injuries caused by a defective product of the predecessor corporation
under the product-line exception to the general rule.
25. See Department of Transp. v. PSC Resources, Inc., 175 N.J. Super. 447, 419 A.2d
[Vol. 43
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These two modem exceptions differ from the four traditional exceptions in
several ways. First, unlike the traditional exceptions, the product-line and
continuation of the enterprise rules did not arise from the need to protect
corporate creditors or dissenting shareholders, or to facilitate tax assess-
ment. Rather, the rules evolved in the product liability area as a means to
provide relief to the victims of manufacturing defects. The courts developed
the modem exceptions in recognition that: (1) unless liability can be im-
posed on the successor, the victim is without a remedy due to the predeces-
sor's dissolution or inability to compensate the victim; (2) the purchasing
corporation can assume the risk of injury better than the consumer of the
product through various risk spreading measures employed when it acquires
the seller's assets and by improvements of the product's quality; and (3) eq-
uitable factors, such as enjoyment of the seller's goodwill, favor the purchas-
ing corporation retaining liability.2 6
Second, the focus of these exceptions is not the form of the transaction by
which the successor acquires the business of the predecessor. In determining
whether to impose liability on the successor, the courts are not limited to the
determination of whether the successor corporation effectively becomes the
selling corporation through the acquisition of not only the seller's assets, but
its entire business as well. 27 Instead, the product-line and continuation of
the enterprise rules emphasize the "practical effect of a particular corporate
transaction [on third parties]." 28
With respect to the specific elements of the modem exceptions, the crucial
distinction between these exceptions and either the de facto-merger or the
traditional continuation exceptions is that continuity of shareholders, direc-
tors, officers, and stock is not considered.2 9 Thus, under the product-line
rule, the courts consider whether the purchaser: (1) has acquired substan-
tially all of the seller's assets, leaving no more than a corporate shell; (2) is
holding itself out to the general public as a continuation of the seller by
producing the same product line under a similar name; and (3) is benefiting
from the seller's goodwill.30 With respect to the continuation of the enter-
prise theory, the test, as developed in Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 31 is
based upon three of the four factors forming the traditional de facto merger
1151 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980) (product-line test invoked to find PSC liable as successor for
water pollution attributable to the action of its predlecessor).
26. See, &g., Kline v. Johns-Manville, 745 F.2d 1217, 1219 (9th Cir. 1984) (product-line
rule); Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145, 1154 (1st Cir. 1974) (continuation of the enter-
prise theory); Jacobs v. Lakewood Aircraft Serv., Inc., 512 F. Supp. 176, 182-83 (E.D. Pa.
1981) (product-line rule); New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection v. Gloucester Envtl. Manage-
ment Servs., Inc., 28 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1397, 1399 (D.N.J. 1988) (product-line rule); Ray
v. ,Mad Corp., 560 P.2d at 5-6 (product-line rule); Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 431 A.2d
at 820-22 (product-line rule); Department of Transp. v. PSC Resources, Inc., 419 A.2d at 1162(product-line rule).
27. Phillips, supra note 10, at 909.
28. Polius v. Clark Equip. Co., 802 F.2d 75, 78 (3d Cir. 1986) (quoting Ramirez v. Am-
sted Indus., Inc., 86 N.J. 332, 341-42, 431 A.2d 811, 816 (1981)).
29. Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 689 P.2d 368, 387 (Wash. 1984).
30. See Ray, 560 P.2d at 8-9; Ramirez, 431 A.2d at 820-22; Martin, 689 P.2d at 387 (en
banc) (construing Ray).
31. 397 Mich. 406, 244 N.W.2d 873 (1976).
1990]
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exception:3 2 (1) continuity of management, other personnel, physical loca-
tion, assets, and general business operations (but not directors, officers or
shareholders); (2) prompt dissolution of the seller corporation; and (3) the
buyer's assumption of those liabilities and obligations necessary to continue
normal business operations. 33
At the state level, then, all states apply the general rule that, in an asset
sale transaction, the purchaser does not automatically acquire the liabilities
associated with the assets.34 All states also admit the four traditional excep-
tions to this general rule in some form. 35 A few states, and primarily in the
product liability area, have adopted additional modem exceptions which in-
crease the likelihood that a successor corporation will be held liable for the
actions of its predecessor.3 6
B. Federal Common Law of Successor Liability
When confronted with the issue of whether successor liability should be
imposed under a federal statute, the federal courts have sought to develop a
uniform federal rule of successor liability that furthers the purposes of the
particular statute.37 In developing such a rule, the courts either have
adopted the general rule of successor liability, as applied in the majority of
the states,38 or have created an independent federal rule of successor liability
specifically tailored to further the purposes of the statute involved. 39 In
CERCLA cases involving successor liability issues, the federal courts so far
have adopted the first approach.40 The second method has been used in
employment discrimination and labor disputes under the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA),4 t the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (CRA),4 2 and the
Equal Employment Opportunity Act (EEOA)43 and, in one notable environ-
mental case, under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
(FIFRA).44
32. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
33. Turner, 244 N.W.2d at 883-84; see also Mozingo v. Correct Mfg. Corp., 752 F.2d 168,
175 (5th Cir. 1985) (explains continuity of enterprise theory as less radical departure from
traditional corporate theory than product-line theory); Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145,
1153-54 (1st Cir. 1974) (sets forth considerations justifying jury's treatment of successor as
continuation of predecessor for purposes of imposing liability).
34. See cases cited supra note 33.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See infra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
38. See, e.g., United States v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 20,621 (D. Mass. 1985) (court invokes traditional continuation exception to find Massa-
chusetts Water Resources Authority liable for its predecessor's violations of Federal Water
Pollution Control Act); Goldstein v. Gardner, 444 F. Supp. 581, 582-84 (N.D. I1. 1987) (court
invokes general rule of successor nonliability with traditional exceptions to find successor not
liable for its predecessor's violations of the Securities Exchange Act); see also cases cited infra
notes 59-129 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
40. See infra note 59.
41. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982).
43. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(l).
44. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136W (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
[Vol. 43
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The practical distinctions between these two approaches are two-fold, af-
fecting the scope and actual uniformity of the federal rule a particular court
adopts. With respect to the rule's scope, the federal courts generally have
developed an independent federal rule when they have found the traditional
rule of successor liability to be too narrow and limited.45 Successor corpora-
tions potentially liable under such an independent rule may difer from those
liable under a more traditional analysis.
Similarly, the actual uniformity of the rule is contingent upon which of
the two approaches the court adopts. If the court adopts an independent
rule and clearly states the elements necessary to find a successor liable, a
consistent, bright-line rule provides clear guidance to corporations planning
transactions. However, if the court simply adopts the general doctrine of
successor liability as it has evolved in the majority of the states,46 the federal
rule's uniformity is contingent upon its evolution and application in the ma-
jority of the states, as subsequently applied by the federal courts. Conse-
quently, as several of the CERCLA successor liability cases demonstrate,47 a
so-called uniform federal rule may be uniform in name only. The practical
implication of such an approach for corporate transactions is the introduc-
tion of an additional element of uncertainty.
L Federal Court Development of an Independent Successor Liability
Doctrine
Primarily in the labor and employment discrimination areas, but also in
one environmental case, the federal courts have developed federal common
law of successor liability that generally combines the traditional exceptions
and the more expansive continuation of the enterprise rule. In a labor
case,48 the United States Supreme Court, after reciting the general rule of
successor liability and some of its traditional exceptions, observed that pre-
vailing policies in the labor-law field necessitate the National Labor Rela-
tions Board's application of a broad successor liability doctrine.49
In determining whether a successor is liable for its predecessor's employ-
45. See infra text accompanying note 53.
46. See supra notes 5-36 and accompanying text.
47. See cases cited infra notes 79-126 and accompanying text.
48. Golden State Bottling Co. v. National Labor Relations Bd., 414 U.S. 168 (1973).
49. Id. at 182-83 n.5. The Court stated:
The perimeters of the labor-law doctrine of successorship, however, have not
been so narrowly confined. Successorship has been found "where the new em-
ployer purchases a part or all of the assets of the predecessor employer, [and]
where the entire business is purchased by the new employer.. . ." The refusal to
adopt a mode of analysis requiring the Board to distinguish among mergers,
consolidations, and purchases of assets is attributable to the fact that, so long as
there is a continuity in the "employing industry," the public policies underlying
the doctrine will be served by its broad application.
Id. (citations omitted). These policies, as the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit succinctly explains in Musikiwamba v. ESSI, Inc., 760 F.2d 740 (7th Cir. 1985), are
threefold: "First, an overriding federal policy against unfair and arbitrary employment prac-
tices is implicated .... Second, the victim of the illegal employment practice is helpless to
protect his rights against an employer's change in the business.... Third, the successor can
provide relief at a minimum cost." Id. at 746. Note the similarity between the last two poli-
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ment-related violations, the federal courts have invoked a balancing test in
which they consider: the successor's notice or lack thereof of the alleged
violation; the predecessor's capacity to provide relief; the substantial con-
tinuity of the business operations; the buyer's use of the same plant, machin-
ery, equipment, and production methods; the buyer's retention of the same
employees (including supervisory personnel) in the same jobs and under sub-
stantially identical working conditions; and the buyer's production of the
same product.50 These elements, with the exception of the first, are quite
similar to those applied in both of the modem exceptions. Thus, in the labor
and employment discrimination areas, the federal courts have fashioned a
federal rule of successor liability that goes beyond the generally accepted
rule and its traditional exceptions and tends to broaden the universe of those
who may be held liable for the actions of their predecessors.
In the environmental area, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, in Oner II, Inc. v. United States Environmental Protection
Agency, 5' apparently adopted a similarly broad successor liability rule.
Although the court did not clearly define the elements of the rule it applied,
the factors on which it relied to find Oner II liable as a successor are instruc-
tive. Specifically, the court pointed out that Oner II had notice of the out-
standing fines that its predecessor, Del, owed the EPA; the president of Del
was also the president of Oner II; the same personnel were retained; and the
same business was conducted.52 There appears to have been no continuity of
stock, shareholders or directors, however, and Del did not dissolve. In find-
ing Oner II liable, the court also relied heavily on the remedial purpose of
the environmental laws: "The EPA's authority to extend liability to succes-
sor corporations stems from the purpose of... [FIFRA], which is to regu-
late pesticides to protect the natural environment. 53
2. Federal Court Adoption of State Successor Liability Rules
Under a number of other federal statutes, the federal courts have deemed
it appropriate to apply the traditional rules of successor liability as devel-
oped in the majority of the states.5 4 The courts that have proceeded in this
manner struggled to define a uniform federal rule of successor liability that
furthers the policy objectives of the federal statute in the face of a number of
variations in the state rules and exceptions.55 The successor liability cases
under CERCLA, discussed in the following section, are prime examples of
the federal courts' attempt to deal with these issues.
cies and policies advanced to support the modem exceptions. Cf. cases cited supra note 26 and
accompanying text.
50. See generally Trujillo v. Longhorn Mfg. Co., 694 F.2d 221, 223 (10th Cir. 1982)(claim based on CRA); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. MacMillian Bloedel Con-
tainers, Inc., 503 F.2d 1086, 1094 (6th Cir. 1974) (claim based on EEOA).
51. 597 F.2d 184 (9th Cir. 1979).
52. Id. at 186-87.
53. Id. at 186.




II. SUCCESSOR LIABILITY UNDER CERCLA
With one exception,56 federal courts have not seriously questioned the ap-
plicability of successor liability under CERCLA. In those decisions apply-
ing successor liability under CERCLA, the courts have uniformly found that
the doctrine of successor liability furthers the remedial purposes of CER-
CLA and have applied the traditional rules of successor liability. 57 The
EPA and the DOJ, however, continue to press for the application of the
more expansive rules adopted by a minority of states.58
A. Successor Liability Under CERCLA as Currently Applied by the
Courts
Those federal courts that have imposed successor liability under CER-
CLA agree that they should apply a uniform federal rule.5 9 It is not a simple
task, however, to extract the elements of a uniform successor liability rule
from these decisions. Rather than develop an independent, carefully tailored
rule for application under CERCLA, the courts have attempted to synthe-
size a uniform rule from the law as it is generally applied in the states on a
more or less ad hoc basis.60
This approach has several practical consequences that are troubling. At
56. See Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 1989 Hazardous Waste Litig. Rep. (An-
drews Publications) 18,126 (E.D. Mich. 1989). After rejecting Smith Land & Improvements
Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 93 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 837, 102 L. Ed.
2d 969 (1989), and its progeny, the Anspec court held that successor liability under CERCLA
is "unnecessary." 1989 Hazardous Waste Litig. Rep. at 18,127. For further discussion of
Smith Land, see infra notes 63-69 and accompanying text. In so holding the court reasoned
that, contrary to the Smith Land court's assumption that Congress intended the courts to
develop a federal common law for ill of CERCLA's provisions, Congress meant for the courts
to develop a federal common law for only those provisions of CERCLA that are ambiguous.
1989 Hazardous Waste Litig. Rep. at 18,127. Consequently, because the court found CER-
CLA's provision explicitly limiting potentially liable parties to generators, transporters, and
past and present owners or operators to be unambiguous, it was precluded from applying the
common law of successor liability to find the defendants (successor corporations of owners and
operators) liable under CERCLA because of their successor status. Id.
57. See cases cited infra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
58. Compare infra Section II.A (discussion of the federal courts application of successor
liability in CERCLA cases) with infra Section II.B (discussion of the EPA's and the DOJ's
position vis-a-vis the appropriate scope of successor liability under CERCLA). A number of
commentators have criticized the EPA's policy, arguing that successor liability under CER-
CLA should be limited to the traditional rules. See, e.g., Barnard, EPA's Policy of Corporate
Successor Liability Under CERCL4, 6 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 78 (1986-87) (arguing against an
expansive rule of successor liability under CERCLA); Burach & Brown, EPA's Policy on Cor-
porate Successor Liability Under Superfund, 9 Chem. & Radiation Waste Litig. Rep. (Chem. &
Radiation Waste Litig. Rep.) 649 (1985) (criticizing equities of EPA's policy); Spracker, Cor-
porate and Liability Consequences ofAcquiring En vironmental Sensitive Properties, 18 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,364 (1988) (analyzing policy reasons against expanded successor lia-
bility under CERCLA).
59. See, e.g., Smith Land & Improvements Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 92 (3d
Cir. 1988), cert denied, 109 S. Ct. 837, 102 L. Ed. 2d 969 (1989); In re Acushnet River & New
Bedford Harbor, 712 F. Supp. 1010,1013-14 (D. Mass. 1989); United States v. Bliss, Nos. 84-
2086C(1), 87-1558C(1), 84-1148C(l), 84-2092C(l), slip op. at 13-14 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 27, 1988);
Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. ASARCO, Inc., 1989 Hazardous Waste Litig. Rep. (Andrews Pub-
lications) 17,239, 17,305 (W.D. Wash. 1989).
60. Smith Land, 851 F.2d at 91-92.
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best, the federal courts would be engaged in the task of defining general rules
of successor liability under CERCLA by reconciling or choosing from
among several state variations. In practice, however, the courts usually have
ignored the differences among the states and have simply determined that
the rule applied in the interested state is sufficiently representative of the
general rule to be accepted as a guide for the rule of decision in the instant
case.6 ' The result is a degree of unpredictability in the elements of a given
exception, especially the traditional continuation of the business exception,
that a deciding court will apply.
To further complicate the matter, the courts in CERCLA cases have fre-
quently justified their adoption of the rule of decision with policy arguments
substantially similar to those enunciated for adopting the modem successor
liability rules for asset transactions, while restricting the exceptions actually
applied to the four traditional exceptions.62 Accordingly, it is difficult to
predict whether the courts, in an appropriate case, would limit successor
liability to the traditional exceptions or would expand it beyond these
boundaries. The federal courts have not yet squarely addressed a case in
which one or more of the elements of the traditional exceptions were absent
but in which each element of one of the modem exceptions was present.
1. Policy Basis for Applying Successor Liability Under CERCLA
As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit noted in
Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp. (Smith Land),63 CER-
CLA does not explicitly require the imposition of successor liability.64 In
finding that successor liability nevertheless furthers the goals of CERCLA,
that court explained that congressional intent favored successors bearing the
costs, inasmuch as successor corporations enjoy both the benefits of using
pollutants and of failing to employ non-hazardous disposal methods. 65
In a number of subsequent decisions concerning successor liability under
61. Id. at 92.
62. For discussion of four exceptions, see supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
63. 851 F.2d at 86.
64. The court stated that "CERCLA failed to address many important issues, including
corporate successor liability." Id. at 91.
65. Id. at 91-92. In supporting the application of traditional concepts of successor liabil-
ity, the court reasoned:
Just as there is liability for ordinary torts or contractual claims, the obligation to
take necessary steps to protect the public should be imposed on a successor
corporation.
Congressional intent supports the conclusion that, when choosing between the
taxpayers of a successor corporation, the successor should bear the cost. Bene-
fits from use of the pollutant as well as savings resulting from the failure to use
non-hazardous disposal methods inured to the original corporation, its succes-
sors, and their respective stockholders and accrued only indirectly, if at all, to
the general public. We believe it in line with the thrust of the legislation to
permit-if not require-successor liability under traditional concepts.
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CERCLA, the courts have invoked the Smith Land court's rationale. 6 Af-
ter quoting Smith Land at length, the United States District Court for Mas-
sachusetts in In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor (Acushnet) 67
added that Congress certainly did not intend to deny the government re-
course against polluters simply because intervening transactions might make
the corporate entity that caused the pollution unavailable to meet the costs
of remediation. 68
These statements of policy upon which the courts have based the applica-
tion of successor liability under CERCLA more closely parallel those sup-
porting the modem rules than the traditional rules. The courts clearly are
not imposing successor liability under CERCLA for the limited purposes of
protecting minority shareholders and facilitation of tax assessment, although
it could be argued that an environmental claimant represents a creditor of
the corporation that deserves protection in the same way the traditional
rules sought to protect creditors. Rather, the courts appear to view the inno-
cent third party injured or threatened by environmental contamination in
the same light as the innocent consumer for whose protection the courts
created the product-line and continuation of the enterprise exceptions.6 9
66. See Acushnet, 712 F. Supp. at 1013. The court in United States v. Crown Roll Leaf,
Inc., 19 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,260 (D.NJ. 1988), said:
As the Smith [Land] court explained, the economic benefits the predecessor cor-
poration reaped from creating toxic pollutants as well as the savings resulting
from the failure to use more costly non-hazardous disposal methods "inured to
the original corporation, its successors and their corporate stockholders." Thus,
those parties responsible under CERCLA include all current owners and opera-
tors of corporations which generate hazardous substances regardless of whether
they owned or operated the facility when hazardous waste was disposed of at the
site in question.
Id. at 20,265; see Michigan v. Thomas Solvent Co., Nos. K86-164, K86-167, slip op. at 23
(W.D. Mich. Dec. 2, 1988) (court reasoned that "the equities favor successor liability here, as
in other successor liability contexts, because it is the successor corporations who have benefited
from any polluting practices of their predecessor); United States v. Bliss, Nos. 84-2086C(l),
87-1558C(l), 84-1148C(l), 84-20926(1), slip op. at 14 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 27, 1988) (imposing
successor liability furthers "CERCLA's policy of placing the burden of response costs upon
responsible parties rather than the public at large").
67. 712 F. Supp. 1010 (D. Mass. 1989).
68. Id. at 1014. The court reasoned:
A paper transaction should not furnish a shield suitable to deflect CERCLA
liability for environmental transgressions preceding the transaction. Yet, in the
absence of successor liability, the government may find itself without any practi-
cal recourse against polluters where, as here, the predecessor corporation is long
disbanded, its assets long disbursed, and its shareholders difficult if not impossi-
ble to locate should they be held personally liable in any way. Congress could
not have intended such a result.
Id.; accord Michigan v. Thomas Solvent Co., Nos. K86-164, K86-167, slip op. at 23 (W.D.
Mich. Dec. 2, 1988). The court explained:
The historical basis for imposing successor liability is founded upon principles of
equity that seek to prevent creditors of the original corporation from being left
without a remedy while the corporation escapes responsibility by transferring its
assets into a new form. There is no reason why a corporation should escape
liability for costs that their pollution imposes on society. Where federal law
assigns responsibility for restitution costs, principles of equity support leaving a
remedy available for the government on behalf of society.
69. See supra notes 22-36 and accompanying text.
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2. Federal Uniform Rule of Successor Liability Under CERCLA
Although there have been only a handful of decisions in which courts
have discussed and applied the various successor liability doctrines under
CERCLA, the following examination of these decisions provides some in-
sight as to the pertinent elements of the evolving rules.
a. Statutory Mergers and Consolidations
Both of the two reported decisions that have addressed the imposition of
CERCLA liability on a corporation that becomes a successor through either
statutory merger or consolidation found the corporate successors liable, fol-
lowing the rule universally applied in the states.70 In addition to establishing
a simple rule for statutory mergers and consolidations (i.e., a corporation
that either merges or consolidates with a responsible party is accountable for
its predecessor's CERCLA liabilities71), Smith Land is important because it
is the only federal appellate court decision on the successor liability issue
under CERCLA. Therefore, several district courts have looked to it for gui-
dance in determining whether to find a successor liable in an asset sale.72
b. Asset Transactions
While there have been only a few decisions addressing successor liability
after an asset transaction, the courts in these cases, following the lead of
Smith Land in the merger and consolidation context, have uniformly held
that the general rule of successor liability as it has evolved in the majority of
jurisdictions should be applied under CERCLA.73 Under CERCLA, there-
fore, the courts have adopted the general rule-the successor is not liable if it
only purchases the assets of the predecessor-together with its four tradi-
tional exceptions. 74
As in most state cases on the issue of successor liability, the federal courts
in these CERCLA cases have focused on the de facto merger and the tradi-
tional continuation of the business exceptions in finding successor corpora-
tions liable. 7" The federal courts, however, have not uniformly applied the
traditional continuation of the business exception or, to a lesser extent, the
de facto-merger exception, which, unlike the simple rule adopted for statu-
tory mergers and consolidations, are not standardized among the states.76
This is because the federal courts, after determining that the interested
70. See Smith Land, 851 F.2d at 92 ("The general doctrine of successor liability in opera-
tion in most states should guide the court's decision rather than the excessively narrow statutes
which might apply in only a few states."); Crown Roll Leaf, Inc., 19 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) at 20,265 (court follows Smith Land and finds Crown Roll Leaf, Inc., which had merged
with responsible party, liable under CERCLA because of its successor status).
71. Smith Land, 851 F.2d at 92.
72. See generally Acushnet, 712 F. Supp. at 1013 (court follows Third Circuit's "compel-
ling" resolution of the issue in Smith Land).
73. See infra notes 79-129 and accompanying text.
74. See supra text accompanying notes 7-9.




state's successor liability law conforms to the generally accepted rule, typi-
cally invoke the applicable exception as it has evolved in the interested state,
giving little if any attention to whether the interested state's formulation of
the rule contains or lacks specific elements that other states use in their for-
mulations.7 7 Furthermore, in a number of cases, rather than turn to a par-
ticular state's construction of the general rule, the courts have applied
another federal court's formulation of the general rule.78
(i) De Facto-Merger Exception. There have been three decisions involving
a successor's liability under CERCLA in which the courts have discussed
the de facto-merger doctrine in detail.7 9 In all of these cases, the courts
found that the generally accepted four-factor de facto-merger test80 should
govern the determination of whether successor liability should be imposed
under CERCLA. Of these three, however, only one-Acushnet8 '-provides
sound guidance as to application of the four-factor test in a CERCLA case.
In Ametek, Inc. v. Pioneer Salt & Chemical Co. 8 2 the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania merely set forth the appropri-
ate test and deferred any analysis of its applicability to trial.8 3 Although, in
United States v. Vertac Chemical Corp., 84 the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Arkansas applied the de facto-merger doctrine,
the court's findings8" have no legal validity after the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals vacated the decision on the grounds that the alleged successor cor-
poration was not properly joined as a party in the lower court, and thus had
not been given a sufficient opportunity to present evidence.86 Consequently,
the following discussion will focus on the Acushnet decision.
In Acushnet the United States District Court for Massachusetts applied
the four-factor de facto-merger test to find the successor liable under CER-
CLA.8 7 The underlying transaction was a stock-for-assets exchange involv-
ing RTE Corporation (RTE), Aerovox, and Aerovox Industries, Inc. (A.I.).
Pursuant to the purchase agreement, Aerovox, a newly created, wholly-
owned subsidiary of RTE, acquired "all of [A.I.'s] assets, property, and
rights of any kind ... [and] assume[d] all of [A.I.'s] balance sheet liabili-
ties .... [But] Aerovox specifically disclaimed any liability arising out of
77. Id.
78. See infra text accompanying notes 111-112.
79. See Acushnet, 712 F. Supp. at 1015-19; Ametek, Inc. v. Pioneer Salt & Chem. Co., 709
F. Supp. 556, 559-60 (E.D. Pa. 1988); United States v. Vertac Chem. Corp., 671 F. Supp. 595,
615-16 (E.D. Ark. 1987), vacated on procedural grounds without reported opinion, 855 F.2d 856
(8th Cir. 1988).
80. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
81. 712 F. Supp. at 1010.
82. 709 F. Supp. 556 (E.D. Pa. 1988).
83. Id. at 559-60.
84. 671 F. Supp. 595 (E.D. Ark. 1987), vacated on procedural grounds without reported
opinion, 855 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1988).
85. The district court found the successor corporation liable under the de facto-merger
exception. 671 F. Supp. at 615-17. The court also held that the successor corporation was
liable under the continuation of the business and fraud exceptions. Id at 614-15, 617-18.
86. Inter-Ag Corp. v. Vertac Chem. Corp., No. 87-2260, slip op. at 3 (8th Cir. Apr. 25,
1988).
87. Acushnet, 712 F. Supp. at 1015-17.
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[A.I.'s] use or disposal of polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs)."88 In ex-
change, A.I. acquired one share of RTE stock for each share of A.I. stock
outstanding. Additionally, A.I. agreed "to liquidate and dissolve promptly
after the transfer of assets, and to distribute the RTE shares to its sharehold-
ers on a pro rata basis."89
In holding Aerovox liable as a successor to A.I., the court had little diffi-
culty finding two of the four factors satisfied. 90 First, in concluding that
there was a continuity of the enterprise, the court relied on a number of
indicators: the officers of A.I. became the officers and directors of Aerovox;
the middle management and employees of A.I. and Aerovox were substan-
tially the same; and furthermore, Aerovox continued the production of the
same products, using the same manufacturing facilities, product name, bank-
ing institutions, and insurance company. 91 In finding continuity of the en-
terprise, the court rejected Aerovox's assertion that continuity did not exist,
because it ceased manufacturing PCB-filled capacitors and had discontinued
some products and added others.92 The court explained that Aerovox's
main business continued to be the manufacture of capacitors, and that there
was no evidence that eliminating PCBs from the capacitors "fundamentally
altered the quality or capability of the capacitors or the market place's per-
ceptions of the product. '93
Second, with respect to the assumption of the seller's obligations necessary
to continue the seller's business operations without interruption, the court
concluded:
Aerovox clearly assumed all those obligations of [A.I.] necessary for it
to continue [A.I.'s] normal business operations uninterrupted. Under
the terms of the 1978 agreement, Aerovox assumed all [A.I.'s] balance
sheet liabilities and agreed to perform all its written contracts. The only
liability specifically excluded was liability arising from [A.I.'s] use and
disposal of PCBs.94
With respect to the third factor, continuity of shareholders, the issue was
more complex, but the court determined that this element was also satisfied,
rejecting Aerovox's assertion that, since A.I. had received shares not of the
buyer (Aerovox) but of the buyer's parent (RTE), the requisite continuity
was missing.95 The court explained that, under the rule there was no logical
reason for the court to require that the shares traded for the seller's assets be
only those of the purchasing corporation. 96 Otherwise, the court reasoned, a
corporation desiring to buy the assets of another company with shares of
stock could always avoid the risk of liability pursuant to the de facto-merger
doctrine by simply creating a wholly-owned subsidiary to act as a
88. Id. at 1012.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1015.
91. Id. at 1015-16.
92. Id. at 1015 n.8.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1016.
95. Id.




With respect to the fourth requirement, the seller's dissolution, the court
found that the seller had also satisfied this element, noting that A.I. did in
fact liquidate and dissolve immediately after the transaction. 98 Three years
after its dissolution, however, over the objection of interested parties, the
Secretary of State of Massachusetts revived A.I. for the limited purpose of
defending the litigation. Thus, despite A.I.'s continued existence as a techni-
cal matter, A.I. had made every effort to terminate its corporate existence.
In sum, following its analysis of each of the four factors, the court concluded
that as a successor to A.I., Aerovox was liable under CERCLA because the
transaction was essentially a de jure merger.99
Although the four factors underlying the de facto-merger exception are
clearly established, the Acushnet decision demonstrates that, in determining
whether the specific circumstances satisfy any one element, the particular
limits of each element are flexible.l°° For example, with respect to the con-
tinuity of enterprise factor, the court in Acushnet found that this element
was met although the successor corporation did not manufacture PCB-filled
capaciters as did its predecessor.101 The Acushnet court also found that
there was a continuity of shareholders even though the selling corporation
received shares of the purchaser's parent rather than the purchaser.10 2 Fi-
nally, the Acushnet court found that the dissolution requirement had been
satisfied because the seller had been revived solely for the purposes of the
litigation.10 3 Thus, where the facts do not neatly satisfy one of the four ele-
ments, the courts may stretch the literal terms of the element to find substan-
tial satisfaction of the factor in question.
(ii) Continuation of the Business Exception. As previously shown, in devel-
oping a uniform federal rule, the courts have drawn upon the laws of the
various states that they have determined to be representative. 104 With re-
spect to the particular elements of the traditional continuation of the busi-
ness exception applicable under CERCLA, the federal courts have applied
97. Id. at 1016. Although the court concluded, on these facts, that this form of transac-
tion did not insulate the purchasing corporation that exchanged its parent corporation's stock
for the transferor's assets, it opined that under certain circumstances such a transaction is "an
effective way for [the parent] to protect itself from liability." Id. at 1017. This dictum is based
on the court's prior decision in which, after considering the underlying facts, it rejected the
United States' position that the court should "pierce the corporate veil of Aerovox [purchasing
corporation] in order to assert jurisdiction over RTE [parent corporation of Aerovox]." In re
Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor, 675 F. Supp. 22, 30 (D. Mass. 1987).
98. Acushnet, 712 F. Supp. at 1017-18.
99. The court noted, however, that because "de facto merger is an equitable doctrine... it
is appropriate under the circumstances, so long as no additional burden of proof is placed upon
the plaintiffs, to require that the assets of [A.I.] must first be looked to to satisfy any damages
resulting from the releases of (A.I.]." Id. at 1019.
100. See supra notes 81-99 and accompanying text.
101. 712 F. Supp. at 1015.
102. Id. at 1016-17.
103. Id. at 1018. Similarly, in Vertac the court found that the dissolution requirement had
been satisfied although the seller did not dissolve but had continued its existence as a shell
company. 671 F. Supp. 595, 616 (E.D. Ark. 1987), vacated on procedural grounds without
reported opinion, 855 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1988).
104. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
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various combinations of the factors that make up the traditional test. Unfor-
tunately, this approach has generated a federal rule, the specific elements of
which are uncertain.
In United States v. Bliss 105 the United States District Court for the East-
ern District of Missouri simply adopted the successor liability rules applied
in Missouri. The court held that the successor liability doctrine applied, and
it further concluded that the successor corporation to an unincorporated
waste transportation business was liable under CERCLA. 0 6
The facts in Bliss were that: (1) two of the three officers, directors, and
sole shareholders of the successor corporation were the former owners of the
unincorporated business and the third officer, director, and shareholder was
a former employee of the unincorporated business; (2) the business opera-
tions continued unchanged; (3) the successor corporation used the same of-
fice, trucks, and employees as its predecessor; (4) the successor retained the
same customers; and (5) the successor presented itself as a continuation of its
predecessor by advertising that it had been in business for over forty years
and continuing to use its predecessor's decals on the side of at least one of its
trucks. 0 7 The presence of these factors had previously led the Supreme
Court of Missouri, under Missouri law, to find the successor corporation
responsible for liability resulting from its predecessor's hazardous waste
management and disposal practices. 0 8 Under the Missouri law, as stated by
the Missouri Supreme Court, it is uncertain which of these factors is control-
ling because:
The general rule is that where one corporation sells, or otherwise trans-
fers, its assets to another corporation, and the circumstances are such
that the purchasing corporation is a continuance of the selling corpora-
tion, the purchasing corporation ipso facto is liable for the debts and
liabilities of the selling corporation. 0 9
The federal court, under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, applied Mis-
souri's successor liability standard as its rule of decision, explaining that the
circumstances warranted imposition of liablility in order to further CER-
CLA's policy of holding the responsible party liable for response costs rather
than the general public." 0
105. Nos. 84-2086C(1), 87-1558C(l), 84-1148C(l), 84-2092C(l), slip op. at 13-14 (E.D.
Mo. Sept. 27, 1988).
106. The Bliss court's holding that the doctrine of corporate successor liability applied
where the predecessor was an unincorporated entity is contrary to the contemporaneous hold-
ing of the court in United States v. Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. 615 (D.N.H. 1988), which found the
doctrine inapplicable. However, the issue may not be of profound significance under many
fact patterns. The Mottolo court itself imposed liability through application of the alter ego
doctrine while indicating that, if applicable, the successor liability doctrine's requirements also
would have been met. Id. at 624-25 n.5.
107. Jerry-Russell Bliss, Inc. v. Hazardous Waste Management Comm'n, 702 S.W.2d 77,
83 (Mo. 1985) (en banc) (Missouri court decision on state law claims in the same case).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 82.
110. The district court stated:
The Missouri doctrine of corporate successor liability is consistent with gener-
ally recognized common law principles of successor liability. Imposition of suc-
cessor liability under the circumstances permitted under Missouri law would
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The United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan in
Michigan v. Thomas SolventII' drew on a different source by applying the
traditional continuation of business exception as it was stated by the Eighth
Circuit in Tucker v. Paxson Machine Co. 112 Courts have used this manner of
application elsewhere.' 13 The test emphasizes only three key factors: (1)
continuity of shareholders; (2) continuity of directors, and (3) continuity of
officers.' " 4
In Thomas Solvent 1 5 the predecessor company operated an industrial sol-
vent distribution and transportation business out of five facilities. In 1982,
the Michigan Department of Natural Resources notified Thomas Solvent
Company that two of its five facilities were suspected sources of groundwater
contamination. Shortly thereafter, Thomas Solvent Company reorganized
through the creation of four additional corporate entities: Thomas Solvent
Company of Detroit, Inc., Thomas Solvent Company of Muskegon, Inc.,
Thomas Solvent Inc. of Indiana, and TSC Transportation, Inc. (collectively,
the spinoff companies).
Richard Thomas and his mother (two of the three directors of Thomas
Solvent Company) became the sole directors of the spinoff companies; Rich-
ard Thomas (who was also president of Thomas Solvent Company) became
the president of each of the spinoff companies. Thomas Solvent Company
subsequently transferred all of its assets, with the exception of the two facili-
ties that allegedly were causing the groundwater contamination, to the spi-
noff companies. In return, the spinoff companies' stock was issued to
Richard Thomas," 6 as trustee of his living trust." 17 Thomas Solvent Com-
pany itself retained none of the consideration paid for its assets.
Following the reorganization, Richard Thomas continued to manage
Thomas Solvent Company and the spinoff companies. The spinoff compa-
nies retained substantially the same employees and provided the same prod-
ucts and services. The spinoff companies also continued to do business with
the former customers of the Thomas Solvent Company's branch operations.
In 1984, confronted with a court order requiring it to initiate containment
further CERCLA's policy of placing the burden of response costs upon respon-
sible parties rather than the public at large.
Bliss, Nos. 84-2086C(1), 87-1558C(1), 84-1148C(l), 84-2092C(1), slip op. at 14 (citations
omitted).
111. Nos. K86-164, K86-167, slip op. at 21-22 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 2, 1988).
112. 645 F.2d 620, 625-26 (8th Cir. 1981). Tucker was a products liability case in which
the federal court, sitting in diversity, refused to find that a Missouri court would apply either
of the modem exceptions to the general rule.
113. See, e.g., Bud Antle, Inc. v. Eastern Foods, Inc., 758 F.2d 1451, 1458-59 (1lth Cir.
1985); Dayton v. Peck, Stow & Wilcox Co., 739 F.2d 690, 693 (Ist Cir. 1984); Leannis v.
Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437, 440 (7th Cir. 1977); see also United States v. Vertac Chem. Co.,
671 F. Supp. 595, 614-15 (E.D. Ark. 1987), vacated on procedural grounds without reported
opinion, 855 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1988).
114. Tucker, 645 F.2d at 625-26.
115. Nos. K86-164, K86-167, slip op. at 3.
116. The stock of Thomas Solvent, Inc. of Indiana was initially issued to Thomas Solvent
Company, but very shortly thereafter was transferred to Richard Thomas' Living Trust.
117. The Trust, therefore, owned 100% of the stock of Thomas Solvent Company and each
of the spinoff companies.
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and remediation activities and with liability for the costs of EPA's remedial
action already taken to contain and clean up the groundwater contamina-
tion, Thomas Solvent Company filed bankruptcy. Thomas Solvent's liquida-
tion generated an amount insufficient to meet these liabilities.
In finding the spinoff corporations liable because of their successor status,
the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan in-
voked the three-factor test discussed above. I18 By limiting its inquiry to the
continuity of shareholders, directors, and officers," 19 the court concluded it
was immaterial that Thomas Solvent Company did not dissolve after the
reorganization, and that each of the spinoff companies performed discreet
functions and was located in a separate geographical area.120
In United States v. Stringfellow 121 the United States District Court for the
Central District of California applied a different variation of the traditional
continuation of the business exception. Specifically, the court applied Cali-
fornia's formulation of the traditional rule, which requires either that no
consideration was given for the predecessor corporation's assets and made
available for meeting the claims of its unsecured creditors, or that one or
more persons were officers, stockholders, or directors of both
corporations. 122
The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington
in Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. ASARC, Inc. 123 applied yet another variation
of the traditional continuation of the business exception drawn from Wash-
ington law. In addition to continuity of officers, directors, and stockholders,
this formulation requires that the consideration to the seller be inade-
quate.' 24 This variation is in contrast to California's formulation, which re-
quires one or the other element to be present, and to the Tucker version
which focuses only on the identity of personnel.' 25
In ASARCO, Inc.,126 L-Bar Products, Inc. (L-Bar) acquired substantially
all of the assets of Industrial Mineral Products, Inc. (IMP). Prior to the
acquisition, IMP processed and marketed smelter slag from a copper mill
that ASARCO owned. L-Bar neither continued IMP's slag business, nor
used the equipment at ASARCO. Furthermore, L-Bar did not purchase
IMP's stock or its name. L-Bar hired a number of IMP's officers and em-
ployees; however, most of them resigned and those that remained assumed
118. Although the court did not specifically consider the fraud exception, it did find that
the conveyance was fraudulent under Michigan law. Nos. K86-164, K86-167, slip op. at 18.
Thus, if the court had not found the continuation of the business exception applicable, the
court might well have relied on the fraud exception.
119. Even though the court did not discuss the adequacy of consideration as pertinent to its
determination of successor liability, it is evident that the consideration was inadequate.
Thomas Solvent Company retained none of the sale proceeds.
120. Nos. K86-164, K86-167, slip. op. at 22.
121. No. CV-83-2501-MML, slip op. at 3-5 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 1984).
122. Id. at 4.
123. 1989 Hazardous Waste Litig. Rep. (Andrews Publications) 17,304 (W.D. Wash.
1989).
124. Id. at 17,305.
125. 645 F.2d 620, 625-26 (8th Cir. 1981).
126. 1989 Hazardous Waste Litig. Rep. (Andrews Publications) at 17,304.
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substantially different positions than the ones they filled while employed by
IMP. Finally, the plaintiff failed to show that the consideration was inade-
quate. The court, therefore, concluded that the elements necessary for the
traditional continuation of the business exception were not satisfied. 127
In sum, although the federal courts have sought to establish a uniform
federal rule of successor liability under CERCLA, they have not yet devel-
oped a traditional continuation of the business exception that is uniform
among the federal courts in terms of its constituent elements.128 The most
generally accepted, and the simplest, formulation of the exception seems to
be the Tucker test, which focuses solely on identity of certain key personnel
and stockholders. 129 Since some courts, however, do look to the law of the
interested state and apply a test that requires the consideration of additional
factors, examination of the adequacy of the consideration in the transaction
or the dissolution of the predecessor corporation, a corporation structuring
an asset transaction should be cognizant of each of these factors in order to
minimize potential successor liability.
B. Efforts to Expand Successor Liability Under CERCLA Beyond the
Traditional Rule
L The EPA's and the DOJ's Arguments for Expansion of Successor
Liability Under CERCLA
Although the federal courts to date have limited corporate successor lia-
bility to the general rule and its traditional exceptions in CERCLA cases,
there is pressure from other sources to expand liability beyond these con-
straints. For example, the EPA maintains the position that successor liabil-
ity for asset transactions under CERCLA should not be limited to the
traditional exceptions.130 The EPA advocates the adoption of the continuity
of business operations exception that the federal courts developed for mat-
ters arising under the NLRA, CRA, EEOA, and FIFRA, in addition to the
traditional exceptions. 13' As noted above, this exception is similar to the
modem product-line and continuation of the enterprise exceptions.13 2 The
EPA contends that if a successor corporation continues substantially the
same business operations of its predecessor, then it should also be held liable
127. Id. at 17,306. Also, in rejecting the fraud exception, the court explained that the
purchase agreement provided for IMP's payment and/or indemnification of the cleanup costs,
and there was evidence that the liquidation trust still in existence on behalf of the shareholders
of IMP might contain sufficient assets in the form of an outstanding note of $1.3 million to pay
an actual liability. Id.
128. This lack of uniformity is more troublesome when one considers that the courts in
Bliss and Mottolo did not agree on the preliminary issue of whether the doctrine of successor
liability even applied to a situation where the predecessor was an unincorporated business
entity. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
129. 645 F.2d at 625-26.
130. EPA Memorandum, Liability of Corporate Shareholders and Successor Corporations
for Abandoned Sites Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Lia-
bility Act (CERCLA) 11 (June 13, 1984) [hereinafter EPA Memo].
131. See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
132. See EPA Memo, supra note 130, at 11 and text accompanying supra note 130.
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under CERCLA.133 The EPA, however, neither identifies the specific ele-
ments of the continuity of business operations rule it would have applied,
nor discusses in detail the policy basis for the application of such a rule
under CERCLA. Despite criticism of its approach, 134 the EPA continues to
adhere to its position.' 35
The DOJ has supported EPA's position in a number of briefs, asserting
that the application of an expansive successor liability rule is appropriate
under CERCLA. t3 6 In a memorandum filed in United States v. Allied
Chemical Corp. 137 the DOJ attempted to clarify the elements of and policy
basis for a continuity of business operations exception under CERCLA.
The DOJ's argument relied on two policy objectives. First, the DOJ con-
cluded from CERCLA's strict liability standard that "Congress intended to
shift the costs of remedying the problems created at waste sites away from
the public to industries that were responsible for creating dangerous condi-
tions or that profited from activities at the sites."' 138 Consequently, the DOJ
contends that permitting a successor to exploit corporate laws undermines
the intent of CERCLA. 139 Second, the DOJ maintains that the adoption of
a broad successor liability rule will force purchasing corporations to evaluate
their predecessors' environmental practices, thereby advancing the statutory
goal that businesses internalize the costs of responsibly disposing of hazard-
ous substances.14
Based on these policy objectives, the DOJ has asserted, as the Ninth Cir-
cuit found in Oner 1, Inc. v. United States Environmental Protection
Agency,' 4 1 that the development of an independent general federal rule for
successor liability under CERCLA consistent with the Golden State Bot-
133. As EPA points out, a lower court in New Jersey has specifically found the product-
line exception applicable to environmental liabilities. EPA Memo, supra note 130, at 14 (citing
New Jersey Transp. Dep't v. PSC Resources, Inc., 175 N.J. Super. 447, 419 A.2d 1151 (Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1980)).
134. See, e.g., Barnard, supra note 58, at 78; Burack & Brown, supra note 58, at 649;
Spracker, supra note 58, at 10,364.
135. Telephone interview with EPA staff attorney, Office of Enforcement and Compliance
Monitoring (Sept. 21, 1989).
136. See, e.g., Joint Motion of Plaintiffs for Summary Judgment on Fraudulent Convey-
ance and Successor Corporation Claims, Mighigan v. Thomas Solvent Co., Nos. K86-164,
K86-167, at 42-44 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 2, 1988) (filed Feb. 5, 1988); Memorandum of Points and
Authorities of the United States in Opposition to Motion of Chemical & Pigment Company for
Partial Summary Judgment and in Support of Cross-Motion of United States for Partial Sum-
mary Judgment, United States v. Allied Chem. Corp., Nos. C-83-5898JPV, C-83-5896JPV, at
15 (N.D. Cal. May 27, 1987) (filed Mar. 12, 1987) [hereinafter DOJ Memo].
137. Nos. C-83-5898JPV, C-83-5896JPV (N.D. Cal. May 27, 1987).
138. DOJ Memo, supra note 136, at 20.
139. Id. at 20-21. The DOJ asserted:
[W]here the successor corporation takes up and continues the business of its
predecessor.., allowing the successor to exploit principles of corporate law that
were fashioned for other reasons and thereby evade liability would defeat the
purposes of CERCLA, and thwart the Congressional intent to shift the costs of
injury away from the public.
Id.
140. Id. at 21-22.
141. 597 F.2d 184, 186-87 (9th Cir. 1975).
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tling 142 approach is warranted. 143 However, the DOJ also has identified the
specific approach adopted in New Jersey Department of Transportation v.
PSC Resources 144 (essentially the modem product-line exception) as appro-
priate under CERCLA.145 Under PSC Resources a successor is liable for the
damages resulting from environmental discharges that are attributable to its
predecessor when the successor corporation acquires all or substantially all
of a predecessor's assets for cash, and the successor corporation continues
essentially the same operation as its predecessor corporation. 146
In sum, the EPA and the DOJ have clearly staked out the position that
successor liability under CERCLA following asset transactions should not
be limited by the traditional rules. The DOJ and the EPA complicate their
argument, however, by treating as interchangeable the independent federal
rules adopted in such cases as Golden State Bottling with the modem state
exceptions to liability applied in such cases as PSC Resources. As noted ear-
lier, the specific elements of these approaches differ.147 Moreover, the policy
reasons on which the independent federal rules and the modem state excep-
tions are based do not necessarily complement those underlying CER-
CLA. 148 Ironically, the federal courts have tended to accept the EPA's and
the DOJ's views as to the policy reasons for successor liability under CER-
CLA, but have not carried this to its logical conclusion by adopting the
modem exceptions.
2. Judicial Response to the Attempted Expansion of Successor Liability
A few courts have discussed the product-line exception to successor liabil-
ity in the CERCLA context, with two courts merely noting that the facts
142. 414 U.S. 168 (1973).
143. DOJ Memo, supra note 136, at 15.
144. 175 N.J. Super. 447, 449, 419 A.2d 1151, 1162 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980).
145. DOJ Memo, supra note 136, at 19.
146. Id.
147. In particular, the modern state rules do not require that the successor corporation
have notice of the alleged violation or liability, whereas notice is an important element of the
successor liability test under the NLRA, CRA, EEOA, and FIFRA. See supra note 50 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of the limitations and hazards of such an "eclectic ap-
proach," see Burack & Brown, supra note 58, at 651-53.
148. See generally Bernard, supra note 58, at 100-01 (corporate transfer of assets does not
terminate EPA's remedy; if held liable for cleanup costs of abandoned hazardous waste sites, it
will be difficult for corporate successors to "assume the risk spreading role;" and successor
corporation does not benefit from its predecessor's goodwill); Spracker, supra note 58, at
10,365 (unlike product liability, United States can recover from other parties or use federal
funds to finance cleanup actions where successor corporations not held liable; and because
conditions and liabilities are generally unknown, successor may not be in best position to assess
and bear risks of cleanup costs).
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did not trigger the exception. 149 In United States v. Stringfellow,I50 however,
the court squarely addressed the applicability of the product-line exception
under CERCLA and rejected it. After explaining that there was "no author-
ity in California or in [the Ninth] Circuit extending the application of Ray
beyond product liability cases,"' 5' the court held that the factors causing
that state supreme court to extend strict product liability to successor corpo-
rations were not as compelling in this particular case.'5 2 Specifically, the
successor defendant was one of thirty defendants and, therefore, the plaintiff
would not be without a remedy if the court were to refuse to find the succes-
sor liable. Moreover, the successor defendant could not spread the costs of
liability by passing such costs on as price increases to its customers, 53 be-
cause the price of its commodity (lead) was determined in the world market.
Consequently, as a matter of law, the court rejected the application of the
product-line exception on the facts before it.154
There can be no assurance, however, that the federal courts will not ex-
pand the successor liability doctrine under CERCLA beyond its traditional
limits in the future. As noted above,' 5 5 the federal courts repeatedly have
based their application of successor liability under CERCLA on policy argu-
ments very close to those used to support more expansive rules. In addition,
as time passes, more states may adopt the more expansive rules so that it
may be possible to argue that they are the generally accepted rules. As the
EPA and the DOJ continue to press their arguments, and as environmental
cleanup burdens on taxpayers mount, the courts may find grounds to ad-
vance beyond the parameters that they have set thus far. Under these cir-
cumstances, it is especially important for corporations to pay careful
attention to successor liability issues in structuring corporate transactions.
The following section outlines some of these practical issues that deserve
attention.
III. PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE APPLICATION OF SUCCESSOR
LIABILITY UNDER CERCLA
In a corporate sale of assets, the parties now are well advised to pay close
attention to the existence and disposition of environmental liabilities. Cer-
tain aspects of the transaction structure may have key implications for suc-
149. See Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., Nos. 81-0851, 83-5493, slip op. at 10 n.5 (E.D.
Pa. May 1, 1989) (available at 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4762) (discussing product-line exception
as adopted by Pennsylvania Superior Court without explaining why product-line exception is
applicable under CERCLA); Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. ASARCO, Inc., 1989 Hazardous
Waste Litig. Rep. (Andrews Publications) 17,304, 17,306 (W.D. Wash. 1989) (although prod-
uct-line exception not recognized in Washington, court opined in dicta that elements of prod-
uct-line exception not satisfied because successor continued some but not all of seller
corporation's operations).
150. No. CV-83-2501-MML, slip op. at 4-5 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 1984).
151. Id. at 4.
152. Id. at 5.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
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cessor liability issues. To illustrate this point, consider the following
hypothetical scenario.
In September 1989 numerous hazardous substances are discovered to con-
taminate the aquifer from which the town of N obtains its drinking water.
The source of the contamination is subsequently located-an inactive dump
site. As a result of its investigation, the EPA learns that, from 1952 to 1968,
A, an unincorporated waste disposal business, owned and operated the dump
site in question. In 1968 the trench in which approximately 5,000 drums of
chemical and petroleum wastes were dumped was full. A covered the pit
with soil, regraded the surface, and sold the property to B, which still owns
the site but has no other assets. Four years after A sold the site, A's owners
incorporated the business, thereby forming A-One Corp., which continues to
exist.
The EPA investigation also identifies the three corporations (C, D, and B)
responsible for generating the wastes that were disposed of at the site. C, a
manufacturer of industrial chemicals, engaged in a statutory merger with U
in 1972, forming CU. In 1985 CU declared bankruptcy and subsequently
dissolved.
D manufactured widgets from 1949 to 1970, at which time V purchased
all of D's assets for cash. The purchase agreement did not specifically ad-
dress the issue of liabilities. V continues to manufacture widgets at these
facilities, using the trade name it acquired from D and holding itself out to
the public as a continuation of D. None of the officers, directors, or share-
holders of D is an officer, director, or shareholder of V. D terminated its
corporate existence after the sale.
The third generator, E, manufactured PCB transformers from 1948 to
1973, at which time W, acting through a wholly-owned subsidiary, W-One,
obtained all of E's assets and all liabilities with the exception of those result-
ing from E's use or disposal of PCBs, which were expressly disclaimed. In
exchange, E's shareholders received one share of W stock for every out-
standing share of E stock. Subsequent to this transaction, E dissolved and
W-One retained E's officers, management, and other salaried and hourly em-
ployees. Although W-One continued the production of transformers, it
modified the process immediately to discontinue the use of PCBs.
Finally, in its investigation, EPA discovers two corporations that trans-
ported wastes to the site. The first, F, was a large, multistage transporter
with five regional subsidiaries. Subsidiary F-One transported wastes to the
site. In an attempt to minimize its exposure to liability for the site, F,
through a series of corporate transformations, formed X (a new holding
company) in 1986 into which Fs four subsidiaries other than F-One were
transferred. F continues to exist as a going concern. Its sole asset is the
stock ofF-One. F-One's assets are insufficient to meet the liabilities arising
from its transporting activities with respect to the site.
G, the second transporter, a corporation with four shareholders (who also
were the corporate officers), transported hazardous wastes until 1975. At
that time Y purchased Gs assets for cash and G dissolved. The corporation
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distributed its assets to its shareholders. The four shareholders/officers of G
did not become shareholders, officers, or employees of Y. Y continued the
hazardous waste transportation operation virtually unchanged. For exam-
ple, Y retained G's other employees (including supervisory personnel), con-
tinued to transport wastes with the identical trucks and under the same
corporate name, and held itself out to be a continuation of G.
Which of this alphabet soup of corporations is liable under CERCLA?
Pursuant to the express provisions of section 107(a),156 the EPA can seek
recovery from A,B,C,D,E,F-One, and G. However, A,C,D,E, and G no
longer exist, and B and F-One have limited assets. The issue becomes which,
if any, of the successors (A-One, CU, V, W, W-One, X and 1') are liable for
remediation costs incurred under CERCLA.
There is a strong likelihood that liability would attach to A-One, although
the precise doctrine under which a court would reach that result is debata-
ble. As noted above, the two district court decisions addressing the issue of
corporate successor liability where the predecessor is an unincorporated
business entity disagree on the result. 15 7 If successor liability is held applica-
ble, A-One would likely be subject to liability as a mere continuation of the
business of A. Even if the successor liability doctrine is held not to apply, it
is likely that a court would find A-One liable under the alter ego doctrine.' 5 8
If CU still existed, it would almost certainly be found liable for the liabili-
ties created by the actions of its predecessor, C. The Smith Land decision
makes clear that a successor corporation created as the result of a statutory
merger is subject to CERCLA liability.' 59 In order to avoid such liabilities,
the parties would have been required to take action prior to the merger to
remove the liabilities from the entities being merged. Actions that they
might have considered to accomplish this result include setting up a separate
entity such as a new corporation or a liquidating trust that would possess the
liabilities and into which they would place sufficient assets to meet these
liabilities.' 60 While such alternatives almost certainly would not have been
contemplated at the time of the 1972 merger of C and U, corporations would
be well advised to consider them today where the potential liabilities are
fairly well known in order to free the corporation created from the merger
from this burden.
The use of such devices where the extent of the liabilities is not so clear is
more problematic since, if the actual costs significantly exceed the amount of
assets supporting the specially created entity, a court might still look to the
successor based on fraud or some other theory. This would likewise be true
156. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
157. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
158. See United States v. Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. 615, 624 (D.N.H. 1988) (discussed supra
note 106.
159. 851 F.2d at 92.
160. Such a trust was used in Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. ASARCO, Inc., 1989 Hazardous
Waste Litig. Rep. (Andrews Publications) 17,304 (W.D. Wash. 1989) (discussed supra notes
123-127 and accompanying text). Indeed, its continued existence and possession of assets that
were likely sufficient to meet the liabilities at issue was one of the factors the court relied upon
in not holding the successor purchaser of the assets liable.
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if the funding of the entity were inadequate in light of the extent of the
liabilities known at the time of its creation. As the situation stands, CU
might or might not be amenable to suit, 161 but in view of the fact that its
dissolution was a result of bankruptcy, any such suit would likely be
pointless.
A court also would be likely to find V liable as successor to D based upon
the implied assumption exception to the general rule. Although the
purchase agreement did not deal specifically with the issue of liabilities, a
strong argument could be made that V implicitly assumed all of D's liabili-
ties, including the liabilities associated with the site in question, when V ef-
fectively took over all of D's business operations. If the transaction was
being negotiated today, after the environmental liabilities became known, V
would be well advised, at the least, to structure the purchase agreement so
that it assumed only enumerated liabilities and expressly disclaimed environ-
mental liabilities. It would also be in V's interest that D not dissolve imme-
diately. In seeking to avoid liability as a successor corporation, it is
extremely helpful to be able to point to an ongoing predecessor that has in its
possession valuable assets to meet its obligations. The dissolution at the be-
hest of the successor of such an entity to which creditors and claimants
could look for redress is one of the factors that the California Supreme Court
expressly relied upon in creating the product-line exception to the general
rule. 162
A court probably would not find V liable as a successor under the tradi-
tional de facto merger or continuation of the business exceptions to the gen-
eral rule. While there is a continuity of business operations at the same
location as the predecessor-the predecessor dissolved, and the purchasing
corporation evidently assumed at least those liabilities necessary to continue
the business without interruption-there is no continuity of the stockhold-
ers, which is a necessary element under the traditional de facto-merger test.
The absence of the continuity of directors, officers, and stockholders, as well
as the payment of a cash consideration that was presumably fair, make it
unlikely that a court would view V as a mere continuation of D.
If, however, the court were to expand the generally accepted rule to in-
clude either the product-line or continuation of the enterprise exceptions, it
might find V liable under these theories. The three elements of the de facto-
161. Most state laws governing dissolution of corporations provide for a limited period of
time after dissolution during which the dissolved corporation is amenable to suit. See gener-
ally 16A W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 8143 (rev.
perm. ed. 1988). Two federal court decisions in CERCLA cases disagree on whether CER-
CLA preempts state laws in this area, and whether the dissolved corporation may be sued after
expiration of this time limit. Compare Levin Metals Corp. v. Parr-Richmond Terminal Co.,
817 F.2d 1448, 1451 (9th Cir. 1987) (CERCLA does not preempt California law determining
dissolved corporation's capacity to be sued) with United States v. Sharon Steel Corp., 681 F.
Supp. 1492, 1498 (D. Utah 1987) (holding "if the effect of a state capacity statute is to limit the
liability of a party Congress meant to hold liable for cleanup costs, Congress intended CER-
CLA to preempt it").
162. See Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3, 5, 8-10 (Cal. 1977); see also supra note 26 and
accompanying text (development of product-line exception).
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merger exception that are present constitute the essential elements of both of
the modern exceptions. Before the fact, in order to protect against liability
without taking steps that would likely have made the transaction considera-
bly less attractive (such as moving the assets, replacing the employees,
changing product names and so forth), V might have looked to creation of a
liquidating trust or an agreement by D (in which adequate indemnification
was provided) to remain in existence and to hold valuable assets, such as all
or part of the consideration paid by V, to meet its obligations.
The facts relating to W-One's and W's purchase of E's assets are essen-
tially identical to those presented to the court in Acushnet discussed
above. 163 In that case the court found satisfaction of all elements of the
traditional de facto-merger exception.164 Where the end result is a de facto-
merger, the express disclaimer of assumption of E's PCB liabilities would
probably be unavailing since no entity remains to service those obligations.
If such a transaction structure were permitted to relieve the purchaser of the
liabilities, it would open a loophole of immense proportions in the whole
doctrine of successor liability.
Based on the elements of the de facto merger exception, one alternative
that might have been considered to avoid liability is the payment of consider-
ation other than the stock of an affiliated company, although this is not al-
ways a viable possibility. Since a claim against a successor is less likely to
succeed if the predecessor is available to meet its obligations, another possi-
bility would have been for W-One to keep E in existence for the purpose of
holding the liabilities together with some valuable assets to meet them. W
should not be subject to liability on these facts unless an argument can be
made that the corporate veil between W and W-One should be pierced. 165
The facts regarding X, F and F-One are similar to those in Thomas Sol-
vent, in which the court found successor liability.166 There are several differ-
ences, however, that probably would lead to the opposite conclusion here.
Most important, F-One was a separate operating subsidiary of F before and
after the reorganization, not the rump entity left after the reorganization in
Thomas Solvent. The fact that F-One had a separate corporate existence
means that a claimant would have to argue that the court should pierce the
corporate veil between F-One and F. If the court did pierce the corporate
veil between F-One and F, it would then analyze whether X is subject to
liability as a successor to F. The court would consider such issues as the
identity of key personnel and stockholders and the adequacy of the consider-
ation paid to F for the assets. A court might also analyze the relationship
among F, X and the four other subsidiaries under the corporate veil doctrine.
163. See supra notes 81-99 and accompanying text.
164. 712 F. Supp. at 1098-99.
165. Presumably, one of the reasons W may have structured the transaction through a
subsidiary was to avail itself of the additional protection provided by the corporate veil doc-
trine. For a discussion of the corporate veil doctrine in federal law cases, see Note, Piercing the
Corporate Veil: The Alter Ego Doctrine under Federal Common Law, 95 HARv. L. REV. 853
(1982).
166. See supra notes 111-120 and accompanying text.
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Y is another corporation that probably would not be found liable as a
successor under the traditional exceptions. It has not paid for the acquired
assets with stock, a fact which makes it very difficult to establish that a de
facto merger took place. There is no continuity of either shareholders, of-
ficers, or directors between Y and G. This fact undercuts any effort to estab-
lish that Y is a mere continuation of G's business under that traditional
exception. Absent an express or implied assumption of the liabilities or
some underlying fraud, Y should not be held liable unless a court were to
expand the generally accepted rule in accordance with the modem excep-
tions. If that were to occur, Y, like V above, might be caught in the more
broadly thrown net of the expanded rule.
If Y is not amenable to a claim, the dissolved G might still be a target. As
noted above in discussing CU, at least one federal court has held that a dis-
solved corporation may be resurrected under CERCLA for an action regard-
ing environmental claims. 167 If such a suit were permitted and successful,
the assets of G could presumably be traced into the hands of its shareholders.
V. CONCLUSION
At the present time, federal courts in CERCLA cases are adhering to the
generally accepted, traditional rule regarding the liability of successor corpo-
rations for the actions of their predecessors. Under this rule, a corporation
that acquires the assets of another corporation generally does not also ac-
quire the liabilities associated with those assets. Four exceptions to this rule
are traditionally recognized: the express or implied assumption of the liabili-
ties by the successor; a fraudulent basis underlying the transaction to secrete
assets from legitimate creditors; a transaction so structured that it is essen-
tially a merger of the predecessor into the successor; and such an identity of
key personnel and stockholders between the predecessor and the successor
(and, in some cases, the presence of other factors) that the latter may be
legitimately said to be a mere continuation of the former.
In applying this traditional rule the federal courts have attempted to syn-
thesize a uniform rule from the law as it is generally applied in the states,
rather than develop an independent, carefully tailored successor liability rule
for CERCLA, an approach taken by federal courts under other statutes. Be-
cause the federal courts in CERCLA cases have typically ignored the varia-
tions in the general rule that have evolved among the states, there exists a
degree of uncertainty in the specific elements of a given exception (especially
the traditional continuation of the business exception) that a deciding court
will apply. Moreover, the federal courts have further complicated the devel-
oping uniform successor liability rule under CERCLA by frequently justify-
ing their adoption of the traditional successor liability doctrine with policy
arguments substantially similar to those underlying the development of the
167. See United States v. Sharon Steel Corp., 681 F. Supp. 1492, 1497-98 (D. Utah 1987).
Considering that G's dissolution occurred fourteen years ago, it is fairly certain that any time
period for suits against a dissolved corporation established under the governing state law
would have long since expired.
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modem, expansive successor liability rules. Despite this incongruity, thus
far the federal courts clearly have limited successor liability associated with
asset transactions under CERCLA to the four traditional exceptions recog-
nized under the general rule.
The EPA and the DOJ, however, both continue to argue that this rule
should be expanded under CERCLA to reach any successor that essentially
continues the same enterprise or product line as the predecessor. This more
expansive approach is very similar to the broader modem exceptions
adopted in some states, primarily in product liability cases. As these agen-
cies continue their pressure and as the burdens of environmental cleanups
continue to grow, it is conceivable that the courts could acquiesce in an ex-
pansion of the traditional rule.
In light of the substantial environmental liabilities that may be involved in
a corporate transaction, it is vital that the parties to the transaction give
careful consideration to the potential allocation of these liabilities following
the transaction, both under current law and with an eye to possible expan-
sion of currently accepted doctrines. Failure to address such issues may re-
sult in a corporation discovering a few months or years after a transaction
that it is unexpectedly saddled with multimillion dollar liability which, with
better planning, it could have avoided.
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